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Introduction
In 1979, Iran underwent a drastic social and political change called the
Islamic Revolution. When Ayatollah Khomeini rose to power amid sweeping
popular dissent and disdain for the existing Western-oriented regime, Iran went
from a secular nation to an Islamic republic. This change drastically shifted
society and social practice. Many observers, particularly those from the West,
lamented the abysmal state of rights and opportunities for Iranian women after the
revolution. While it is indeed true that women in the Islamic Republic of Iran
have often been deprived of their rights, this narrative lacks nuance and fails to
consider the difficulties facing women before the revolution. Moreover, it does
not account for the ways that the rights of Iranian women have improved since the
Islamic Revolution, particularly in education. After the revolution, women began
enrolling in higher education at unprecedented rates. This increase of women in
higher education provides an effective lens for viewing the role of women in
society. A careful examination of women in the Iranian system of higher
education reveals complex religious, political, and cultural features that have at
times both enabled and prevented women from achieving highly in the university
setting. This paper will explore the participation of women in Iranian higher
education from the revolution to today. In doing so, it will demonstrate the
paradoxical relationship the Islamic Revolution has had with women’s roles in the
public realm and the direct way that Islamic ideals promoted during the revolution
encouraged women to study. Ultimately, it will conclude that the Islamic
Revolution helped facilitate a system where women could succeed in education;
as more women became educated under this system, there was a general increase
in women calling for reform of the discriminatory gender policies implemented
after the revolution. Overall, this increase in women in higher education has
contributed to the rise of Islamic feminism and an intrinsic movement of Iranian
women pursuing advancement of their legal and social status.
Review of Existing Research
The phenomena of increasing female enrollment in Iranian institutions of
higher education since 1989 has been well-documented in existing research. Some
researchers attribute this rise to Khomeini. His call for women to be active
participants in the revolution was a mobilizing force that led to women's
participation in the public sector through higher education.1 Others posit that the
1
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government would rather have fewer women in higher education. Indeed,
researchers such as Mitra K. Shavarini note the national debate on the
establishment of quotas to reduce the number of women entering universities.
Because women are passing the college entrance exam and, thus, entering
universities at higher rates than men,2 she argues that the government has begun
to fear women. Despite the early encouragement for women to participate
politically and obtain an education, Shavarini points out that the large number of
educated women pose a threat to the existing patriarchy of Iranian society.
However, despite the more recent push for a reduction of female university
enrollees, Shavarini notes that the government does not use religious arguments;
she asserts that this is because the religion of Islam cannot justify withholding
education from women.3
Golfer Mehran's research, on the other hand, demonstrates a continued
dominance of men in the highest levels of academia. Men drastically outnumber
women in teaching positions at Iranian universities. Only eight percent of those
occupying the highest ranking university teaching positions were female in the
2007-2008 academic year. There are similar gender gaps among those studying
for the more elite doctoral and masters degrees.4 Indeed, gender discrimination in
Iran is a continuing problem for women. Rossana Bahramitash offers an in-depth
view of women’s economic role in Iran before and after the revolution. Her
research shows that during the two decades following the Iranian Revolution, the
growth of female employment has risen more than during the former Pahlavi
regime. She argues this is a result of Islam breaking down barriers that hindered
women's opportunities to participate in the public sector.5 However, it is
important to note that even in this more optimistic research, indicators still show
women working at much lower rates than men in Iran. Moreover, in their research
Goli M. Rezai-Rashti and Valentine Moghadam point out the difficulty for Iranian
women seeking employment. Through data and personal interviews the
researchers demonstrate an economic, social, and legal system that favors men.
This means that although women continue to perform well academically, they are
consistently underrepresented in the labor market. This is due to a complicated
mixture of a cultural history of patriarchy that leads to negative perceptions of
2
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women seeking work outside the home, a conservative religious environment that
tends to make men hesitant to work with marriageable women, and an already
struggling economic system where there are fewer jobs than people ready to
work. As a result, young women report experiencing high rates of open
discrimination in the work place and difficulty finding professional placement.6
There is also a significant body of work that points out the importance of
feminism, specifically the emergence Islamic feminism in Iranian universities and
in the society as a whole. Islamic feminism is important in understanding women
and their role in and access to higher education. Shavarini defines the term
“Muslim feminism” as a branch within the larger body of feminist thought that
seeks to improve the status of women, legally and socially, within the Muslim
world. Muslim feminism identifies religion as one of the problems women must
overcome, and it rejects the Western feminism that came alongside modernization
as sexually exploitive and colonialist in nature.7 Halper notes that the very fact
that the government is Islamic in nature provides room for religious debate within
the context of legal rights for women. As a result, Islamic feminists are able to
reinterpret religious texts to support their advocacy for more legal rights.8 Janet
Afary further addresses this tendency in her book, adding that Islamic feminists
focus on religious writers who reinterpret Shari’a law to favor women’s rights and
lawyers who seek more egalitarian family laws.9 Afary acknowledges that new
interpretations of the Koran have been giving women a more public role since the
start of the Revolution when Khomeini used religion as a call to action among
women.10 Amina Tawasil further examines conservative Islamic women who
study in seminaries. These women also break down gender barriers by using and
reinterpreting the Islamic texts to justify higher education and a more public role
for women in Iran. These highly educated, religiously conservative women view
Islam as a means, rather than an obstacle, to overcoming gender oppression.11 The
emergence of Islamic feminism is an extremely important feature in
understanding the rise of women in universities. However, to fully appreciate the
6
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movement, it is useful to have a complete understanding of the religious and
social climate into which it was born. For this reason, this paper will first discuss
the various political developments since the Islamic Revolution before focusing
on the Islamic feminist movement in more depth.
Gender and Politics on the Eve of the Revolution
While researchers note the problematic Westernized narrative of the
oppressed Muslim woman12 and the perception among Westerners that the poor
social and legal situation of Iranian women is inherent to the Islamic nature of the
government,13 it is important to note that the long tradition of patriarchy and the
minimal involvement of women in the public sector in Iran predates the Islamic
Revolution of 1979. For example, women were not given the right to vote until
1963, and criticism of women’s suffrage was prominent not only among religious
clerics but also members of the less-religious middle class. What's more even
some progressives opposed women’s suffrage.14 Many critics point out the higher
rates of female employment in industrialized nations than in majority Muslim
nations.15 However, an examination of Iranian history reveals a low rate of female
employment during the modernization and Westernization movements of the
secular Pahlavi regime. Although veiling for women was outlawed in 1936 by
Reza Shah, this move was more a political symbol of a secular state than an effort
to curtail the tradition of patriarchy in Iran.16 In fact, patriarchal cultural
tendencies continued throughout the 20th century. As Bahramitash notes, despite
more legal freedom for women during this period, female employment did not
begin to significantly increase until the 1960s,17 coinciding with the White
Revolution of Mohammad Reza Shah. Yet, although there was an increase in
female employment under the modern government of the Shah, Bahramitash
observes that this rise was less significant than the rise that occurred after the
Islamic Revolution.18 This indicates that there is not necessarily a relationship
between an Islamic government and a decrease in the presence of women in the
public sector as some have suggested. Moreover, it shows that the challenges
12
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facing women in Iran are long-standing and not necessarily resulting from the
implementation of an Islamic government.
Further, it is necessary to point out the huge rise in educated women since
the Islamic Revolution. According to Shavarini, on the eve of the revolution
female university enrollment was at its peak. However, she critiques the statistics
for excluding women from rural areas or from low socio-economic backgrounds,
as well as minority women. Because the school system of the Pahlavi era was
secular, many women (and men) from culturally and religious traditional families
did not attend school.19 Indeed, Rezai-Rashti cites data showing an increase in
literacy among women after the 1979 Revolution, with 35.5 % of all Iranian
women (not just the socially elite) being literate in 1976 compared to 52.1% in
1986.20 Thus, it is evident that there was a significant problem in women’s
education and employment prior to the institution of an Islamic government in
Iran.
The low status of women in Iran even during the era of modernization is
unsurprising given the tradition of patriarchy existing in Persian culture.
Jamsheed K. Choksy notes that during the Sasanian era of Iranian history, the
period when Islam was being introduced to the region, the Muslim caliphs were
typically relaxed in their enforcement of Muslim norms, and, as a result, many
typically Iranian traditions and norms continued in Persian society. Under the
Muslim Umayyad Dynasty that brought Islam to the region, the legal status of
women did not change from the existing Persian norms; women, even Muslim
women, continued to be treated as property—bought, sold, and exchanged.21
Thus, it is clear that patriarchal social structures were aspects of Iranian culture
before the introduction of Islam. The perpetuation of this patriarchy into the 20th
century, as evidenced by the generally unequal conditions for most women under
the secular Pahlavi regime, is, therefore, unsurprising, nor should it be attributed
solely to Islam.
Khomeini and the Era of Revolution
After his rise to power in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini became one of the
public figures with the most influence on women in Iran. Khomeini had a
paradoxical influence on the presence of women at universities and, broadly
speaking, in the public realm as a whole. On the one hand, the Islamic Revolution
19
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was largely dependent on the political activity of women. Khomeini called on
women to militarize and come out in support of an Islamic government during the
revolution, and afterward, he advocated for female education.22 According to the
conservative Shi’a religious community in Iran, women’s education is a duty.
Although the role of motherhood was heavily emphasized by the revolutionary
regime, education was also necessary in order to raise strong Islamic children
well-grounded in the Islamic sciences and Koranic texts.23
Yet, even as education was being emphasized for young women as an
Islamic duty, the education system itself was drastically changing. New laws
seeking to render the public arena completely Islamic severely limited women’s
ability to appear and express themselves in public. Veiling became mandatory for
all women, and strict sex segregation was mandated in institutions of higher
education.24 In order to make them more 'Islamic,' the new regime closed
universities from 1980 to 1983. During this time universities underwent a
sweeping purification process known as the Cultural Revolution. Under the
Cultural Revolution, the curriculum was examined and evaluated according to
how well it maintained Islamic values. Faculty whose views were judged to be
discordant with those of the regime were fired. Further, an ideological test was
added to the admissions process in an effort to ensure the appropriate moral
character of all university attendees. Prospective students took a written exam and
underwent an investigation in which applicants’ neighbors might be interviewed
to determine suitability.25 Although the universities did eventually reopen, they
were no longer the institutions created under the Pahlavi regime. With many
talented faculty gone, fewer and lower quality textbooks, and a redesigned
curriculum, the universities after 1983 hardly resembled their former selves.
Under the new system, women were barred from 78 fields of study due to
“biological reasoning.”26 Most of the subjects from which women were banned
were technical or in the engineering field.27
In many ways, the Cultural Revolution led to an overall decrease in
academic quality. This is a development lamented by Azar Nafisi in her memoir
of her time as a professor at Tehran University. Nafisi mentions the resulting low
academic standards of the universities after many dissident faculty members were

22
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fired and curriculum was censored and monitored.28 This sentiment is echoed by
Shavarini in her interviews with Iranian students. A young Iranian student
expressed to Shavarini that her courses are “weak,”29 complaining that her high
school courses were more challenging. She also feels that she is forced to take too
many courses not pertaining to her area of study (at least one Islamic course per
term). Moreover, she feels that she does not have access to high quality textbooks.
Shavarini notes that these concerns are not limited to a few students. She points to
a systemic problem in Iranian universities of unqualified professors, outdated
books and technology, and highly censored curriculum.30 This problem began
with Khomeini’s Cultural Revolution and persists in universities today.
As might be expected after such a drastic change, when the universities
did reopen fewer female students enrolled than in the previous term. Yet, this
decrease of women in higher education can be contrasted with an increase of
women and girls in primary and secondary education. Rezai-Rashti argues that
this increase in female education immediately following the Cultural Revolution
was due to the moralizing of the public space. In other words, because the school
system had become appropriately Islamic through gender segregation and the
enforcement of morality standards in public spaces, traditional and religious
families were now more comfortable sending their daughters to school.31 This is
an important consideration and a fitting explanation considering that by the 198586 academic year, female university enrollment was up to 30% compared to 28%
during the 1974-75 academic year.32 However, in the face of these modest gains,
it would be remiss not to also mention the deprivation of rights many women
encountered at the university. This period was characterized by executions with
many professors either killed or imprisoned for holding ideas or beliefs were
deemed a threat to the Islamic Republic. Khomeini's government even executed
Farrokhru Parsa, the Minister of Education during the Pahlavi regime.33 Further,
intense discriminatory laws were enacted that presented women with significant
challenges. The Family Protection Act of 1967 was supplanted by a new body of
law based on Shari’a that severely limited women’s rights within the family. It is,
thus, unsurprising that in 1986, the Iranian census indicated growing gender
28

Azar Nafisi, Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books (New York: Random House Trade,
2003): 32.
29
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30
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inequality.34 Thus, while women began making modest gains in education soon
after the revolution, violence and fear still pervaded the university culture.
The Rise of Women at the University
Nonetheless, the 1990s signified a shift regarding women's involvement in
education. Despite the low levels of women enrolling in tertiary education
immediately following the Islamic Revolution, the numbers of women attending
university rose at unprecedented levels during the 1990s. This period of
increasing enrollment was also marked by the lifting of many of the restrictions
on women implemented during the previous decade.35 The complex interplay of
increasing female enrollment in higher education and the lifting of legal
restrictions on women will be explored in more detail in a later section. First, it is
necessary to establish the changing trends and demographics on Iranian university
campuses in order to more appropriately discuss this phenomenon.
It is vital to note that, simply because of the passage of time, many of the
young women who were increasingly attending primary and secondary education
during the 1980s were coming of university age in the 1990s, allowing more
women to be qualified to apply for university admission. This author suggests that
this fact alone may be largely responsible for the increase of women attending
universities during this period. However, whether this can be attributed more to
the natural aging of women or to other shifting social conditions is impossible to
determine from currently available research. Nonetheless, Rezai-Rashti provides
data showing a general increase of women in tertiary education in the late 1990’s
and early 2000’s. In 1997, women comprise 37% of all university students, and by
2000, they form 45%. This number grows to 51% in 2005.36 This is a remarkable
reversal of the gender gap in less than ten years. Mehran examines the rates of
women at the faculty level of universities during this period. While men still
greatly outnumbered women in university teaching positions, women did gain
ground between the 1998-99 and the 2007-08 academic years. Unfortunately,
women made the largest gains as assistant lecturers, the lowest-ranking faculty
position, while the gender gap at the highest level remained virtually unchanged.37
Notwithstanding, it is not unreasonable to assume that change occurs more slowly
at the highest levels of academia. The years of study that it takes to become a
professor in an Iranian university greatly outnumber the years to become an
34

Rezai-Rashti and Moghadam “Women and Higher Education,” 423-24.
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36
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assistant lecturer because doctoral degrees are necessary to become a professor
while people holding masters degrees may be considered qualified for a position
as an assistant lecturer.38 Thus, it will be interesting to watch data emerging in
coming years to determine if the gender gap will begin to close more rapidly as
the large number of women enrolled in universities continue their studies and
eventually achieve doctoral degrees and distinction in their fields or if social
pressure to marry and have children will keep college-educated women from
working in academia. One disquieting trend indicating that a gender gap may
persist among faculty is that only 33% of those studying at the specialized
doctoral level (the highest degree available) were women during the 2007-2008
academic year.39 This continuation of the gender gap at the highest levels of
academia is unsurprising. As Shavarini points out, there is a lack of accomplished
female role models for young Iranian women. The only feminine ideal the women
she interviewed were able to produce was Fatima, the daughter of the prophet and
wife of Ali who is venerated for her role as mother and nurturer.40 This suggests
that there may remain significant cultural obstacles to overcome for women in
universities.
In short, while the increase of women in higher education is a positive
development, it alone has not resulted in a gender equal society. In the next
section, this paper will discuss the ongoing challenges facing women despite their
growing academic achievement as well as the neo-conservative reaction to the
increase in women’s education.
Continued Challenges and the Neo-Conservative Movement
So far, this paper has focused primarily on the positive developments for
women’s education in Iran following the establishment of the Islamic Republic.
Nonetheless, any discussion of women’s role in Iranian society would be
incomplete without an examination of the persistent disadvantages women
continue to face as well as the surge of conservatism that occurred as women
began making greater gains in the public sector.
A conservative movement was certainly present during the reformist
presidency of Mohammad Khatami beginning in 1997; however, the election of
the conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidency in 2005 marks
a significant shift in Iranian public opinion. Whereas under the more lenient laws
of the Khatami government women on university campuses flourished, the
38
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40
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Ahmidenajad government made a decided effort to discourage women’s presence
in all areas of the public realm, including on university campuses. Much like
Ayatollah Khomeini had done 30 years earlier, Ahmidenajad forced many
reformist professors out of the education system. Moreover, women’s high
academic achievement at universities led to a national debate about the
establishment of gender quotas. In Iran, there is a rigorous exam called the kunkur
that determines college admissions. In 2002, 62% of those who passed this exam,
thus winning eligibility to study at a university, were female. Shortly after the
release of this information, the Iranian parliament instituted gender quotas in
public universities. To support this position, they cited the fact that most collegeeducated women do not join the work force. Some viewed it, therefore, as a waste
to spend so many resources educating young women who will not use their degree
in service to society. Others worried that the gender imbalance would upset the
social structure of the family and that too many educated women would lead to
unhappy marriages.41 The conservative government responded to this reversal of
the gender gap by implementing a strict return to gender segregation. Not only
were women banned from 77 fields of study at the university level, but men were
also restricted from certain fields of study deemed to be feminine. The policy of
gendering the higher education system was intended to limit women’s educational
options. The Iranian Minister of Science who was responsible for higher
education under the Ahmadinejad government actively promoted this policy of
sex segregation as well as the establishment of quotas.42
As might be expected, this resurgence of political oppression sparked
strong political resistance, particularly from women’s groups, but this sort of
dissent was met with harsh punishment including arrest and imprisonment.
Indeed, the Ahmadinejad government was so anxious to curtail political dissent
and agitation regarding women’s rights that it closed the popular feminist
magazine, Zanan, in 2008.43 Nonetheless, despite this seemingly staunch
commitment to limiting women’s higher education evidenced by the
government’s strict policy and its intense squelching of any opposition, in
actuality many of these policies were never practically implemented. Iranian
universities lacked the faculty and the resources to enforce gender segregation
among all subjects. Universities that did follow the policy inevitably faced with
considerable financial hardship. Consequently, the application of sex segregation
and gender quotas in Iran was ineffective, and the policies were laid aside.44
41
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Even with the relaxing of gender segregation in universities, women
continue to face many challenges with regards to their education and their
prospects after receiving their degrees. Shavarini focuses her research on Iranian
woman, particularly emphasizing the individual voice of young women. She
conducts interviews and case studies in order to understand the women that make
up the system. This method is particularly useful in examining the subtlety of the
gender inequalities in Iranian education, what drives women to educational
achievement, what they perceive to be their most significant challenges, and how
they view their own roles within society.
For example, Shavarini suggests that one reason women pass the kunkur at
such high rates is because, as high school students, they have no other outlets.
Because most extra-curricular activities are not open to girls, they have more time
to study and prepare for the exam.45 Further, a theme repeated by many of her
subjects is that education is one of the few ways that they can earn social value.
Some subjects described the intense familial pressure to do well in school; among
members of the community and within their extended families, girls who perform
well on the kunkur and attend universities instantly receive an elevated social
status.46 Many women see their position in society as second-class and see
education as the main means by which they may raise their social status.47
Another interesting way Iranian women use education to navigate a
society where they have fewer legal and social rights than men is through the
practice of mehrieh, a monetary gift for the bride negotiated in the marriage
contract. Traditionally, women deferred the payment of mehrieh until the end of
the marriage—either through death or divorce. However, the sum of the money is
the property of the woman and may be collected at any time. Thus, the ability to
negotiate a high mehrieh is a means by which a woman can increase her social
power and ensure rights she is not afforded by law. Since the Revolution, the
practice of mehrieh has become more popular among educated women.48 This is
unsurprising considering the repeal of the 1967 Family Protection Law which
provided women considerable legal rights as well as the institution of a new body
of law that drastically lowered women’s legal and social standing.49 Thus, the
practice of mehrieh has become crucial for women to avoid the potential illeffects of many of the discriminatory family laws. Education plays a key role in
this practice. One woman reports how her brother used her doctoral degree as a
45
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justification for the high mehrieh he requested for her marriage.50 In this system, a
university education becomes a bargaining tool, a way for a woman to raise her
social value and obtain for herself a series of protections and rights within the
marriage agreement otherwise unavailable to her.
A second useful factor of marriage for educated women is economic.
Women consistently form extremely small proportions of the working population.
Iran’s poor economy and patriarchal cultural tendencies continue to bar women
from the labor market. Shavarini notes the frustration of many of Iranian women
seeking to find employment. For women who do manage to find work, promotion
is often difficult because of social ideas of gender and authority.51 Although
Rezai-Rashti and Moghadam point out that women seem to chiefly view mehrieh
not as a means of gaining economic power but as a means of securing or
preventing divorce and other matters related to family law,52 education may also
serve to secure the economic future of women by allowing them to marry into a
higher socio-economic class than the one from which they come. With few
prospects for financial independence, many women see education as a means of
finding a suitable partner who will be able to provide for a family, thus securing
their financial futures.53 In essence, in a society where women are given fewer
rights and privileges and generally valued less than men, education becomes and
invaluable tool for women to promote their own self-interests and increase their
social standing, even if the ultimate end for many of these women is, in fact,
marriage and domestic life.
Islamic Feminism
Finally, this last section will examine the rise of Islamic feminism in Iran
and its complex interplay with the university system. This section will draw on
the trends and data reported in the previous sections as well as the cultural and
historical information described above. Without an understanding of the issues
and intricacies described in previous sections, it would be impossible to
demonstrate how the rise in the number of educated young women, facilitated by
the Islamic Revolution, aided the development of Islamic feminism in Iran.
Further, Islamic feminists have been active in agitating for an increase in
women’s rights and roles in the public sector. Thus, Islamic feminism and female

50
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higher education in Iran have formed a cyclical relationship where one influences
and facilitates the other.
Mehran argues a similar cyclical phenomenon relating to the participation
of women in Iranian society and their welfare according to the Women’s
Empowerment Framework (WEF) developed by Sara Longwe. Longwe’s model
describes a hierarchal system where increased welfare is the first level of equality
followed by access, conscientisation, participation, and finally control. While this
framework argues an upward, linear movement, Mehran argues that in the case of
Iran, a cyclical relationship between the levels of conscientisation and
participation is more useful in understanding women’s roles in Iran following the
Iranian revolution. Here, the term conscientisation is understood as the awareness
that gender roles are cultural constructs that may be changed. Mehran contends
that women actively participated in the Islamic Revolution. As a result, there was
an increase in conscientisation. This increase in gender awareness in turn led to an
increase in women’s participation in the decision-making process, and so on.54 In
other words, an increase in participation leads to an increase in gender awareness.
This author would slightly adapt this interpretation to explain the development of
Islamic feminism and its role in higher education. After the revolution, women
were able to participate in higher education at higher rates. This ability to be
present in the public space coupled with the confidence and knowledge gained
through education and achievement facilitated an increase in feminist thought,
and the growing number of educated women supplied Iranian feminism with a
broader audience. In the wake of the revolution, the promotion of religion within
society and the concerted effort to create a uniquely Iranian society, this style of
feminism developed distinct from Western feminist thought and consistent with
Islamic and Iranian cultural values and experiences. The growing strength of
Islamic feminism allowed it to assert itself more forcefully in society and
advocate more effectively for an increase in women’s legal and social rights.
When this was successful, it allowed women more roles in society and more
ability to attend university. This subsequently led to an increase in women
participating in Islamic feminist thought, and the cycle repeated itself.
The emergence of Islamic feminism during the early revolutionary years is
noted by Rezai-Rashti. These women challenged the discriminatory laws
instituted by the new government and reinterpreted some of the religious texts in
favor of more egalitarian applications. Rezai-Rashti notes the importance of
Islamic feminists in promoting gender equality and challenging the government’s
discriminatory gender policies since the beginning of the revolution.55 There were
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certainly secular and westernized women, particularly among university faculty,
who opposed gender discrimination based on humanistic values. Nafisi poignantly
describes her own frustrations with the restrictive society based on her
experiences in pre-revolution Iran and America where she was educated.56
However, it is important to note that Islamic feminism is a branch of feminist
thought that is unique in that it is grounded in Islamic tradition and thought rather
than Western feminist thought applied to an Islamic society. While Islamic
feminists may come from varying religious backgrounds and beliefs as well as
different levels of religiosity, the school of thought cannot be separated from
Islamic tradition. Therefore, more relevant to our discussion are the female
seminaries (called howzevi),57 and the rise of women educated in and able to
interpret the Koran.
Firstly, it is essential to note that not all female scholars of Islam are
necessarily Islamic feminists. There are women that spend years studying the
Koran but still apply the same patriarchal codes of wider society to their
understandings. However, the fact that these seminaries exist and that women are
allowed to experience these high levels of religious knowledge is essential to the
development of Islamic feminism. A significant part of Islamic feminist
scholarship focuses on reinterpreting Koranic texts in favor of more egalitarian
gender policies. Many women go to seminaries in order to study the Islamic texts
and body of law, some of whom apply Islamic feminist interpretations.58
However, even the howzevi women who do not align themselves with Islamic
feminist thought help to provide legitimacy to the position of Islamic feminist. By
participating in religious scholarship, these women help to pave the way for other
women to read and form their own interpretations of the Koran.
The religious focus of the movement appeals to religious women and men,
providing a righteous alternative to the patriarchal practices prominent in society.
Here, it is interesting to note Tawasil’s research on women who study at
seminaries, many under conservative religious leaders such as Ayatollah
Khamanei and Ayatollah Larijani. Oftentimes, these women interpret their main
roles in the traditional revolutionary sense as being mothers and Islamic militants.
As a result, their primary duty remains marriage and raising Islamic children to be
citizens of the Islamic Republic. Nonetheless, Tawasil contends that many of
these women manage their domestic duty in a manner that allows their own
upward social mobility within the male-dominated power structures.59 Although
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studying at a seminary does not automatically make a woman an Islamic feminist,
the very fact that women are allowed to be jurists and study at seminaries
legitimizes the rights of female religious scholars to interpret the Koran in
accordance with Islamic feminist thought. Further, by participating in high levels
of society, these women forge the path for other women to do the same.
Islamic feminism is an important development because it allows an outlet
for religious women to advocate for their rights within their own religious
communities. Prior to the revolution, secular women’s organizations existed in
order to promote women, but their secular orientation alienated many religious
women. For example, the Woman’s Organization of Iran (WOI) campaigned for
women’s rights in the pre-revolutionary era, even taking on religious issues such
as honor killings. However, the lack of a religious orientation made the WOI
unpopular among religious groups. Consequently, for many conservative religious
people, feminism became associated with the secularism and modernism against
which they struggled. Indeed, many of these policies that promoted women were
mainly oriented toward urban, secular women, ultimately leaving behind the rural
and religious women.60
In 1991, Zanan, Iran’s most prominent women’s publication, began
publishing. It served as a mouthpiece for the growing coalition of women
representing varying sects of society who sought to improve conditions for
women in Iran. Indeed, Zanan was explicitly feminist and provided space for
discussing many of the most crucial issues facing Iranian women as well as
celebrating the achievements and joys of life as a woman.61 The 2008 closing of
the magazine demonstrates its efficacy and the perceived threat it held in the eyes
of the politically and religiously conservative sectors of society. Nonetheless, the
magazine reopened in 2014,62 suggesting that there may once again be an increase
in willingness to engage in feminist conversations, as found in the magazine
which represents a platform for Islamic feminist thinkers to engage in ideological
debate and discussion.
Concluding Remarks
The role of women in Iranian society remains a divisive subject. This
paper has examined the complexity of the issue through the lens of women’s
participation in higher education. The presence of women at universities in Iran is
a promising proponent for the continued advancement of women in Iranian
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society. The continuation of patriarchal norms, both those preserved in the society
through religious practice and those resulting from the patriarchal culture
predating the implementation of institutionalized Islam, are an ongoing challenge
for women. While the paradoxical relationship of women’s rights and the Islamic
Revolution is an interesting study, it is important to remember the persistent
challenges facing women. Education in Iran has served as a platform for women
to advance themselves personally, but also broadens their scope of influence on
society and allows for the development and advancement of Islamic feminist
thought. This development of Islamic feminism has allowed for Iranian women to
find ways to better their conditions within their society in ways that Western
feminist practice during the Pahlavi era did not. The Islamic Revolutions played a
significant role in facilitating women’s ability to study at institutions of higher
education, thus enabling an educated group of women to emerge in Islamic
feminist thought, challenging the same discriminatory practices of the government
that enabled their educational advancement. Overall, the continued education of
women in Iran and the continued commitment of Islamic feminists to agitate for
women’s rights appears to be the most effective and practical solution for
advancement of women in Iranian society while also allowing the emerging
changes to reflect a cultural tradition unique to Iranian society.
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